Obama's No-Win Strategy in Afghanistan

President Obama’s speech on Afghanistan was driven more by politics at home than reality on the ground in Afghanistan. He sought to satisfy everyone, and got criticized by everyone.

Obama identified the enemy as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. First, it is widely acknowledged that Al-Qaeda is better established and more dangerous in Pakistan than in Afghanistan, and its miniscule numbers in Afghanistan (just over 100 members, per estimates) certainly don’t warrant an additional 30K troops, over the 108K US and NATO troops already there.

As for the Taliban, the Administration has already hinted, directly and through its minions (Karzai government), that it’s willing to negotiate. In addition to their religious fervor, the Taliban have been winning in Afghanistan mainly because they operate in an environment where people have few jobs, even less hope and absolutely nothing to lose. The US can't defeat those with 30K more troops when they’ve been losing with over 100K.

If Obama really wanted a viable Afghan solution, it would have been by adopting the very strategy that both Democrats and Republicans are united in opposing: serious nation building, which requires difficult, long-term commitments. But, given their economic challenges and political realities, Americans have no appetite for that.

Obama was in a no-win situation, and he chose a no-win strategy. Instead, he should have adopted the classically-American approach: Cut the losses, declare victory and pull out.

Syria, Has it won?

An article from the latest issue of The Economist: Syria, Has it won?

The case for skepticism on Obama’s Middle East policy

Beyond the stream of upbeat statements from Washington, and the early-term speech in Cairo and televised address to Iran, the initial optimism that President Obama would deliver a significant change to the turbulent Middle East is steadily eroding, giving way to skepticism and disappointment, if not outright pessimism. After 11 months in the Oval Office, beyond the eloquent speeches and numbing oratory, developments on the ground do not provide for a very encouraging picture. In fact, the picture looks rather bleak across the various flash points of the Middle East.

In Iraq, President Obama seems keen to deliver on his promise to withdraw US troops from Iraq by 2010. However, the situation there remains tenuous at best, and all indications are that Iraq will be left in shambles, with a shattered economy, fractious society, violated sovereignty and compromised security. After a period of relative calm in the center of the country, suicide bombers are, again, striking at government buildings and random civilians. The death toll is starting to climb back up, while a shockingly inept, sectarian government seems incapable of protecting its citizens, providing jobs and services, and managing diplomacy. The Kurds, meanwhile, are moving forward with a constitution that effectively makes them sovereign from the rest of Iraq. And, in the complex fight for regional dominance, the major players are increasingly using Iraq to settle scores and gain strategic leverage against their regional rivals, with Iran the clear winner to date. In short, as President Obama prepares for exiting the Iraqi theater, the situation after the upcoming US withdrawal does not bode well for the country.

On the Palestinian side, the situation is as dire as ever. The US, and its regional clients (Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia) remain unwilling to acknowledge the results of the 2006 Palestinian elections that brought the hardline Islamic Hamas to power, and continue to prop up the popularly-discredited and morally-bankrupt Palestinian Authority. As a result, the Palestinian people have never been more divided, with the PA barely holding on to power in the West Bank, and its rival Hamas in control in Gaza. More recently, on the heels of the debacle of President Mahmoud Abbas’ withdrawal of the PA’s support for the Goldstone report last September, his ultimate disgrace came from his own Israeli and American allies, by the former’s provocative refusal to freeze settlements in the occupied territories, and the latter’s acquiescence. After Israel’s embarrassing rebuff of President Obama’s public position demanding a settlement freeze, Obama backed down, accepting Israel’s demand that negotiations continue without pre-conditions, and bestowing accolades upon Netanyahu, leaving Mahmound Abbas weakened and exposed. Paradoxically, the Palestinians’ standard of living is the worst it has been in over a decade, and they seem farther from statehood now than at any time since the beginning of the George W Bush presidency in 2000.

On Iran, President Obama’s early address to Iran’s people and leadership and open invitation to dialogue was a welcome first step. Many were hopeful that the new Administration was about to usher in a period of US-Iranian détente, whose impact would be felt across the wider Middle East. To date, beyond the speech, we have seen neither gestures nor diplomacy to justify such hope. Rather, following the contested Presidential elections in June, we saw the normally-careful President Obama succumbing to political pressure by abandoning his cautious approach to dealing with the post-election violence, in favor of the standard-issue, non-effective statements, taking sides in an election that should be the dominion of Iranians only. And, while there were some indications of progress in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, it’s very unlikely to produce any breakthroughs. After all, with Iran’s growing regional clout and political advances all over the chess map, from Iraq to Lebanon, Gaza and more recently, Yemen, there is nothing compelling the Iranians to back down. Meanwhile, there is increasingly alarming bellicose language from the Administration that is more reminiscent of the previous administration’s positions than those we expected to hear from a fresh Obama approach.

On Syria, after much talk about renewed engagement and some hopeful early signs that included sending Senator Mitchell for several rounds of discussions with Syria’s leadership, and the appointment of a yet-unnamed ambassador to Damascus, nothing substantive has been accomplished. The snail’s pace, tactical and equivocal approach to dialogue with Syria has been disappointing. The Obama Administration seems to be more interested in ensuring an orderly withdrawal out of Iraq than in true engagement with Syria on the broader regional issues. In addition, the US, under Obama, has shown no interest in taking an active role in renewing the stalled indirect ‘peace’ negotiations that Turkey has been sponsoring between Syria and Israel, in the midst of a consistent chorus of statements by Israeli officials declaring that Israel would not withdraw from the Golan Heights, in essence turning Israel’s back on peace with Syria. An Israeli commitment to a full withdrawal from the occupied Golan is an absolute requisite for a peace treaty with Syria, and hence for amelioration in the security situation in the region. No such peace is possible without active US sponsorship for the process.

There is a clear pattern that has been developing over the past 11 months: Eloquent speeches followed by shy but encouraging signs of a new approach, invoking opposition by entrenched interests, causing a quick retreat back to the business-as-usual old policies of previous administrations. There is a glaring lack of leadership on display, perhaps driven by the President’s political reality at home. In light of his looming domestic battles from healthcare to the economy, it is questionable how much political capital Obama is willing to spend on his Middle East agenda. Regardless, President Obama himself has set the bar rather high, and with it, our expectations. His quick retreats have cast doubt on his commitment and ability to deliver – if not the sincerity of his early declarations.

Iran's Election - A Contrarian View

I admit that I didn’t think that Iranian protests would still be dominating the news headlines, more than 10 days after the election results were announced, but here we still are.

Strangely enough, it seems that this still is the story, and it doesn’t seem to be nearing a happy ending. Of course, I don’t have an interest in one outcome or the other, nor do I favor one candidate or another. Indeed, all along, I thought, and still do, that both candidates are establishment candidates, and that within Iran’s power structure, either one would serve the regime rather well. And, to a large extent, I also believed that Iran’s presidential elections are, for the most part, fair and free, once you accept the selection criteria of the official candidates.

What I find perplexing and, indeed, disingenuous, is this impassioned support for Mir Hossein Moussavi in the West. All of a sudden, this committed Islamic revolutionary and ex-Prime Minister who served under Ayatollah Khomeini during the Iraq war, has miraculously been transformed into a quasi-liberal reformer and even the anti-establishment candidate, by many in Western media and political circles.

To be clear, I never thought that much of President Ahmedinejad. To me, he always seemed a quasi-comical character whose loose lid was craftily leveraged by the real power brokers within the Iranian regime to their own advantage, particularly in regard to the relationship with the West in general, and America, in particular. That’s not to say President Ahmedinejad is a toothless figurehead, but, by most accounts, the President is more of a super-mayor of sorts, rather than the final arbiter at the top of the power pyramid of Iran. And, from a PR perspective, I have always thought that, as a provincial layman, President Ahmedinejad, was more sincere to, and reflective of, his wide base among Iran's poor and downtrodden, but that he did a great disservice in representing this ancient and rich people and civilization to the rest of the world.

That said, Mir Hossein Moussavi, until recently has been…well, a “has been”. By most accounts, he is not a name that resonates with most Iranians. He lacks the real power base that Ahmedinejad has among the lower segments of Iran’s economically deprived population, while not appealing to the upper echelons who despise the entire Islamic establishment, of which he has always been an integral part.

All of this is to say that I believe, based on my own reading of the situation, that given the candidate choice offered to Iranians in the election, it was, likely won by President Ahmedinejad, as the regime asserts. I am not claiming that the elections were faultless, but the charge that this election was rigged rings hollow to me. Instead, what I am seeing are significant segments of the Iranian population, who have long been frustrated and alienated by a cocktail of social, economic and religious grievances with the regime, taking advantage of a great opportunity to register their displeasure and anger, aided and abetted by a biased and 'invested' America, well-armed with high technology, and modern traditional and social media.

I am no apologist for the Iranian government, to be sure. As an ardent secularist, I find any system of government with any hint of religion utterly objectionable. However, I am just as committed to judgement based on facts and objectivity. Now, let’s consider, for a moment, the opposite of what’s presumed and presented by Western media: WHAT IF President Ahmedinejad had, indeed, won the election? What would be expected of the Iranian authorities? Are they supposed to sit idly by as they see many of their people being manipulated, from outside, into causing civil strife and threatening the security of the regime? Would they not be expected to protect the regime and impose order?

Finally, regardless of the outcome, I find American and Western positions on the election results myopic and self-defeating. President Obama’s instincts were right at the beginning, when he chose not to interfere and take a strong official position on what should be a purely Iranian issue. However, it quickly became politically costly for him to remain measured, and he was pressured into taking a progressively stronger position. This tells me that the West, and America in particular, has not learnt from its past mistakes in the Middle East in general, and in Iran, specifically. Fifty five years after the CIA's overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq in ’54, which opened a wound between Iran and America that has yet to heal, here comes America and the West, again interfering in Iran’s internal affairs, and supporting one group of Iranians against another.

To me, there can be no winner here. If President Ahmedinejad emerges from this crisis on top, Obama’s efforts toward improving the political climate for a direct dialogue with Iran will have been significantly undermined. And, if by chance, the regime loses and some sweeping change envelops Iran, America’s gain will surely be short-lived, as the will of large and significant segments of the Iranian population will have been thwarted by America’s meddling yet again. And the stage will then be set for another round that is good for neither Iran nor America.

Syria: the Key to Regional Peace

President Obama’s Middle East envoy, George Mitchell said last Friday that Syria has “a key role to play” in forging a Middle East peace.  Mr. Mitchell, who is a respectable diplomat and a seasoned hand at negotiating peace agreements is partially right.  Syria is, indeed “key” to a broader Middle East peace.  But, in my opinion, Syria is the key, and not a key to a peace agreement.  Here’s the logic:

On the political front, having earned its credentials as a frontline resistance state championing the nationalist Arab and Palestinian cause against Israeli occupation, and having paid the price for that role – militarily, politically and economically, Syria today, can confer a certain legitimacy on any peace agreement between Arabs and Israelis, that no other Arab country can. As evidence, an agreement with Egypt since 1979 produced no breakthrough in Israel’s relationship with the wider Arab World.  And, even the 1993 Oslo Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, led by their iconic torch-bearer, Yasser Arafat, produced no peace dividend with other Arabs, in large part, because Syria was not included.

On the military and security front, an Israeli-Syrian agreement would effectively bring an end to the state of war between the two countries, and with it, an end to Syria’s alliance with, and support for, countries and organizations that are committed to the armed struggle against Israel.  Militias and parties such as Hezbollah and Hamas would be “encouraged” to pursue their agenda politically, rather than militarily.  Given Syria’s “strategic relationship” with Iran and its borders with Lebanon and Israel, such an agreement would deliver security to Israel’s only remaining borders, which would translate to a dramatic improvement in regional security.

Of course, the above presumes that the terms of such peace agreement meet Syria’s floor for an historic settlement.  If so, in spite of its small population and economy, a peace agreement with Syria would bring a darmatic improvement to the political and security landscape of the region, and swing open the gates for bilateral and regional agreements, that would enable Israel to be finally integrated into the broader region.

This is why Syria is, and will continue to be the, not just a, key to broader Middle East peace.

Iran's Elections

Like it or not, within the limited Islamic constitution of the Republic, Iranian elections are to a fair degree free and healthy.  Multiple candidates from different backgrounds, with competing programs and agendas engage in a healthy and vibrant debate about all facets of Iranian life – social, economic and political, covered and supported by hundreds of newspapers and print publications as well as a bustling cyberspace.  Turnout is quite high, reaching or exceeding 80% across all social segments, but especially among young people.  And, the winner is neither predetermined nor assured.

Isn’t this what democracy is all about?  Sure, it’s not perfect, given that all candidates have to be approved by an unelected Guardian Council to ensure compliance with the goals and ideals of the Islamic Revolution.  But, let’s not make the good the opposite of the perfect.  These are far freer elections with more integrity than those electoral travesties carried out in the rest of the Middle East, including the farse that happened in Lebanon earlier this week.

And, notwithstanding the outcome, Iran’s elections indicate that given Iranians’ practice and comfort with democracy, when the Constitution finally is changed and Iran is no longer an Islamic theocracy, Iranians’ transition to a broader vibrant, and maybe even liberal, democracy will be relatively painless.

Compared to Egypt, the only comparable Arab country in size, where “elections” are tantamount to a referendum on the single candidate who has been in power for 29 years, with the state’s media, institutions and resources dedicated to his adulation, offering no platform or agenda, inspiring no debate and generally securing no less than 95% of the vote, Iran’s has all the hallmarks of a real Middle Eastern democracy, albeit within Iran’s very imperfect Islamic framework.

A note on Lebanon's elections

Regardless of their outcome, last week’s Lebanese elections were a sham, and presented a poor example of democracy to the rest of the Middle East.

Money from Saudi Arabia, through its protégé (and Saudi national), Saad Hariri, bought off votes by the tens of thousands in this small country.  As an example, Lebanese immigrants from as far away as Europe, Canada, US and Australia were offered a free trip (read vacation) to Beirut, paid for by Hariri, in exchange for their vote. 

Result notwithstanding, with minor change in distribution among the major political blocks, the political scene continues to be dominated by the same sect-based clan leaders and warlords who have ”managed” the country during its violent 16-year civil war, including Walid Jumblatt, Michel Aoun, Samir Geagea, Nabih Berri, and a couple Jemayyels.

This does not bode well for the future of Lebanon.  With a veto-yielding minority, the new “majority” can rule no more effectively than before.  And, Lebanon will remain weak, divided and fractious, and will continue to serve as a battlefield for regional heavyweights to wage their proxy battles.